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1There is a third important dimension of the role of government.  What level of government should be delegated
responsibility and authority:  local, state, regional, Federal, multinational, or global?  There is, of course, no general
answer.  The answer will depend upon specific characteristics of individual environmental policy issues.  The debates
on this question have often been analytically flawed.  For clarification, see:  Revesz 1997.
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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING:
HOW DOES (AND HOW SHOULD) GOVERNMENT BALANCE
THESE TWO IMPORTANT VALUES?
Robert Stavins
*
The conference organizers have asked us to “tackle the critical conundrum” — how business,
government, and communications media balance the competing values of economic growth and a
healthy environment.  In a sense, my focus is narrower, because I concentrate exclusively on
government policy, and ask how government integrates economic concerns into its development of
environmental policies.  But in another sense, my focus is broader, because I also ask whether and
how government should carry out such integration of economic and environmental concerns.
In this brief paper, I consider two dimensions of environmental policy, which are closely
interrelated but conceptually distinct:  (1) what is the appropriate (and actual) degree of government
activity; and (2) what form should (and does) government activity take.
1  In this brief essay, I
attempt to define the scope of these questions, and suggest criteria that can be used to evaluate
responses.
1.  WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE DEGREE OF GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL REALM?
The fundamental theoretical argument for government activity in the environmental realm
is that pollution is a classic example of an externality (an unintended consequence of market
decisions, which affects individuals other than the decision maker).  Because firm-level decisions
do not take into account full social costs, pollutant emissions tend to be higher than socially optimal
levels.  As environmental quality is thus naturally under-provided by competitive markets, a possible
role arises for government regulation.  Private negotiation will not internalize such externalities
adequately without government intervention, and exclusive reliance on judicial remedies is2Externalities in the environmental realm are not bilateral, but involve public goods with multi-party impacts.
Transaction costs and third-party impacts preclude the possibility of private negotiation leading to simple, efficient
solutions (Coase 1960).  For largely the same reasons, private tort litigation — with its considerable transaction costs
— will not solve the bulk of environmental problems.
3See:  Arrow, Cropper, Eads, Hahn, Lave, Noll, Portney, Russell, Schmalensee, Smith, and Stavins (1996).
4During the 1990s, equity concerns played increasing roles in environmental policy debates (Hahn, Olmstead, and
Stavins 2003).  President Clinton’s Executive Order 12866 was the first among the series of Presidential executive
orders dealing with regulatory analysis to include distributional concerns.  Also, the “property rights movement” in the
western United States was fundamentally about the distribution of regulatory costs (particularly in the context of the
Endangered Species Act and wetlands regulation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act).
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insufficient to the task.
2  Hence, since the time of the first Earth Day in 1970, which we may take
as the beginning of the modern era of environmental policy, industrialized countries throughout the
world have relied mainly upon a combination of legislative and administrative procedures to foster
improvements in their natural environments.
If it is appropriate for government to be involved in environmental protection, how intensive
should that activity be?  In real-world environmental policy, this question becomes, “How stringent
should our environmental goals and standards be?”  For example, in the United States, should we
cut back sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions by 10 million tons, or would a 12 million ton reduction be
better?  In general, how clean is clean enough?  How safe is safe enough?
Most economists would argue that economic efficiency — measured as the difference
between benefits and costs — ought to be one of the major criteria for evaluating proposed
environmental, health, and safety regulations.
3  Because society has limited resources to spend on
regulation, benefit-cost analysis can help illuminate the trade-offs involved in making different kinds
of social investments.  In this regard, it seems irresponsible not to conduct such analyses, since they
can inform decisions about how scarce resources can be put to the greatest social good.  Benefit-cost
analysis can also help answer the question of how much regulation is enough.  From an efficiency
standpoint, the answer to this question is simple — regulate until the incremental benefits from
regulation are just offset by the incremental costs.  In practice, of course, the problem is much more
difficult, in large part because of inherent challenges in measuring marginal benefits and costs.  But
the fact that we are unable to measure benefits and costs with perfect precision ought not be taken
as a compelling argument to abandon such analytical methods altogether, lest we allow the perfect
to be the enemy of the good.
Concerns about “fairness” (distributional equity) also merit serious consideration.
Regulatory policies inevitably involve winners and losers, even when aggregate benefits exceed
aggregate costs.  For this reason, assessments of the distributional implications of public policies
should be (and in recent years typically are) carried out, at the same time as assessments of
aggregate benefits and costs.
4  Beyond efficiency and distributional equity, non-economic factors
— such as those regarding process — can also be of key importance.  The general view from
economics is that other criteria in addition to efficiency can and should be employed by policy
makers, but that the existence of such criteria does not invalidate the efficiency criterion, which
should remain part of social decision-making.5Statutes that have been interpreted (in part, at least) to restrict the ability of regulators to consider benefits and costs
include:  the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act; health standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act;
safety regulations from National Highway and Transportation Safety Agency; the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water Act;
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act.  On the other hand, parts of the Clean Water Act, the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Toxic Substances
Control Act, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act explicitly allow
or require regulators to consider benefits and costs.
6More importantly, there is rigorous, empirical evidence that agencies take into account benefits and costs of regulatory
decisions, even when governing statutes do not encourage or allow such analysis to affect decisions.  See, for example:
Cropper et al. 1992.
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There is little doubt that a reallocation of expenditures on environmental, health, and safety
regulations has the potential to save significant numbers of lives while using fewer resources.  As
seen in Table 1, the estimated cost per statistical life saved has varied across regulations by a factor
of more than a million!  Thus, a reallocation of priorities among these same regulations could save
many more lives at given cost, or, alternatively, save the same number of lives at much lower cost.
Over the years, policy makers have sent mixed signals regarding the use of benefit-cost
analysis in policy evaluation.  Congress has passed several statutes to protect health, safety, and the
environment that effectively preclude the consideration of benefits and costs in the development of
certain regulations, even though other statutes actually require the use of benefit-cost analysis.
5  But
this has not prevented regulatory agencies from considering the benefits and costs of their regulatory
proposals.  Otherwise, what are all those lobbyists doing at EPA headquarters?
6  The problem with
such informal, implicit benefit-cost analysis is that it can be unsystematic, not subject to peer review,
and carried out behind closed doors, with access limited to the particular friends of the
administration.  Thus, we ought to be concerned about this approach not only on technical grounds
(poor analysis), but on process grounds — it is fundamentally undemocratic.
At the same time as Congress has sent mixed signals regarding the use of economic analysis
in environmental policy assessment, Presidents Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush all
introduced formal processes for reviewing economic implications of major environmental, health,
and safety regulations (using so-called Regulatory Impact Analysis).  Apparently the Executive
Branch, charged with designing and implementing regulations, has seen a greater need than the
Congress to develop a yardstick against which the efficiency of regulatory proposals can be
assessed; benefit-cost analysis has been the yardstick of choice.
Although formal benefit-cost analysis should not be viewed as either necessary or sufficient
for designing sensible public policy, it can provide an exceptionally useful framework for
consistently organizing disparate information, and in this way, it can greatly improve the process
and hence the outcome of policy analysis.  If properly done, benefit-cost analysis can be of great
help to agencies participating in the development of regulations, and it can likewise be useful in
evaluating agency decision making and in shaping statutes.
Despite such arguments, formal benefit-cost analysis has only infrequently been used to help
set the stringency of environmental standards.  The politics of environmental policy have favored
a very different set of approaches to setting standards, such as that embraced by the Clean Air Act:
set the standard to “protect the most sensitive member of the population with an adequate margin7But President Clinton did sign the Small Business Regulatory Reform Act of 1996, which provides an opportunity for
the Congress to pass legislation that nullifies a regulation that does not pass a benefit-cost test (the nullification itself
is then subject to possible Presidential veto, like any act of Congress).
8Proposals for the use of a benefit-cost test for setting environmental standards have found a more receptive audience
among the states.  As of 1996, some 25 of 35 states surveyed reported significant environmental regulatory reform
efforts, defined as including the establishment of benefit-cost criteria for promulgation of regulations (Graham and
Loevzel 1997).
9Diverse factors have caused command-and-control instruments to so dominate environmental regulation.  See:
Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1998).
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of safety.”  Economists and legal scholars have spent a great deal of time arguing that such criteria
are neither reasonable nor well defined, but little change has occurred.  The significant heterogeneity
of costs per life saved under existing statutes, portrayed in Table 1, suggests that in the absence of
a benefit-cost test aimed at achieving efficiency, much could be accomplished through greater
attention to simple cost-effectiveness, that is, achieving given goals or standards at minimum cost.
In the 104th Congress, a major part of the Republicans’ “Contract with America” was a
regulatory reform August 25, 2003bill that would have made meeting a benefit-cost test a necessary
condition for a broad set of regulatory actions.  That bill was narrowly defeated in the Senate, and
would have faced a certain Presidential veto, in any case.
7  Subsequently, Congress considered but
did not enact legislation (introduced by former Senator Fred Thompson and Senator Carl Levin)
which would have required agencies to conduct (non-binding) benefit-cost analyses of new
regulations and periodically of existing ones.  Congressional efforts at such generic “regulatory
reform” are unlikely to disappear from the policy landscape, and there will continue to be attempts
— sometimes successful — to introduce benefit-cost tests into individual environmental statutes.
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2.  WHAT FORM SHOULD GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY TAKE
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL REALM?
Once the goals or standards of any given environmental policy are established (whether on
political, scientific, economic, ethical, or any other grounds), policy makers are left to ask what form
should government involvement take.  In other words, what means — what policy instruments —
should be used to achieve the established ends?  Economists consistently have urged the use of
“market-based” instruments — principally pollution taxes and tradeable permits — rather than so-
called “command-and-control” instruments, such as design standards, which require the use of
particular technologies, or performance standards, which prescribe the maximum amount of
pollution that individual sources can emit.  At least in theory, market-based instruments are cost
effective, that is, they minimize the aggregate cost of achieving a given level of environmental
protection, and provide dynamic incentives for the adoption and diffusion of cheaper and better
control technologies.  Despite these advantages, however, market-based instruments have been used
far less frequently than command-and-control standards.
9
Gradually, the political process has become more receptive to market-based instruments.
Beginning in the 1970's, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) offered states the option
of employing variants of tradeable permits for the control of localized, criteria air pollutants.  More10For a detailed survey of the use of market-based instruments for environmental protection in the United States, as well
as other nations, see:  Stavins (2003).
11For a more thorough exploration of the answers to this question, see:  Stavins (1998).
12But there has been some increased understanding of market-based approaches among policy makers.  This has partly
been due to increased understanding by their staffs, a function — to some degree — of the economics training that is
now common in law schools, and the proliferation of schools of public policy (Hahn and Stavins 1991).
13But the environmental advocacy community is by no means unanimous in its support for market-based instruments.
See, for example, Seligman 1994.
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significantly, tradeable-permit systems were used in the 1980's to accomplish the phasedown of lead
in gasoline, and to facilitate the phaseout of ozone-depleting chloroflourocarbons (CFC’s); and in
the 1990's to implement stricter air pollution controls in the Los Angeles metropolitan region, and
—  most important of all — to control acid rain under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 (Table
2).  This last program — the trading of sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions allowances to reduce acid rain
— is saving the country $1 billion per year in compliance costs, while achieving the statutory goal
more quickly than could have been accomplished by a conventional approach.
10
Given the historical lack of receptiveness by the political process to market-based approaches
to environmental protection, why has there been a relatively recent rise in the use of market-based
approaches?
11  It would be gratifying to believe that increased understanding of market-based
instruments had played a large part in fostering their increased political acceptance, but how
important has this really been?  In 1981, Steven Kelman surveyed Congressional staff members, and
found that support and opposition to market-based environmental policy instruments was based
largely on ideological grounds: Republicans, who supported the concept of economic-incentive
approaches, offered as a reason the assertion that “the free market works,” or “less government
intervention” is desirable, without any real awareness or understanding of the economic arguments
for market-based programs.  Likewise, Democratic opposition was based largely upon ideological
factors, with little or no apparent understanding of the real advantages or disadvantages of the
various instruments (Kelman 1981).  What would happen if we were to replicate Kelman’s survey
today?  My refutable hypothesis is that we would find increased support from Republicans, greatly
increased support from Democrats, but insufficient improvements in understanding to explain these
changes.
12  So what else has mattered?
First, one factor has surely been increased pollution control costs, which have led to greater
demand for cost-effective instruments.  By the late 1980’s, even political liberals and
environmentalists were beginning to question whether conventional regulations could produce
further gains in environmental quality.  During the previous twenty years, pollution abatement costs
had continually increased, as stricter standards moved the private sector up the marginal abatement-
cost function.  By 1990, U.S. pollution control costs had reached $125 billion annually, nearly a
300% increase in real terms from 1972 levels (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 1990; Jaffe,
Peterson, Portney, and Stavins 1995).
Second, a factor that became important in the late 1980’s was strong and vocal support from
some segments of the environmental community.
13  By supporting tradeable permits for acid rain
control, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) seized a market niche in the environmental14When the memberships (and financial resources) of other environmental advocacy groups subsequently declined with
the election of the environmentally-friendly Clinton-Gore Administration, EDF continued to prosper and grow (Lowry
1993).  In 2003, the World Resources Institute was alone among environmental advocacy groups to support the George
W. Bush administration’s water quality trading policy.
15The Reagan Administration enthusiastically embraced a market-oriented ideology, but demonstrated little interest in
employing actual market-based policies in the environmental area.  From the Bush Administration through the Clinton
Administration, interest and activity regarding market-based instruments — particularly tradeable permit systems —
continued to increase, although the pace of activity in terms of newly implemented programs declined during the Clinton
years, when a considerable part of the related focus was on global climate policy (Hahn, Olmstead, and Stavins 2003).
6
movement, and successfully distinguished itself from other groups.
14  Related to this, a third factor
was that the SO2 allowance trading program, the leaded gasoline phasedown, and the CFC phaseout
were all designed to reduce emissions, not simply to reallocate them cost-effectively among sources.
Market-based instruments are most likely to be politically acceptable when proposed to achieve
environmental improvements that would not otherwise be feasible (politically or economically).
Fourth, deliberations regarding the SO2 allowance system, the lead system, and CFC trading
differed from previous attempts by economists to influence environmental policy in an important
way:  the separation of ends from means, that is, the separation of consideration of goals and targets
from the policy instruments used to achieve those targets.  By accepting — implicitly or otherwise
— the politically identified (and potentially inefficient) goal, the ten-million ton reduction of SO2
emissions, for example, economists were able to focus successfully on the importance of adopting
a cost-effective means of achieving that goal.
Fifth, acid rain was an unregulated problem until the SO2 allowance trading program of 1990;
and the same can be said for leaded gasoline and CFC’s.  Hence, there were no existing
constituencies — in the private sector, the environmental advocacy community, or government —
for the status quo approach, because there was no status quo approach.  We should be more
optimistic about introducing market-based instruments for “new” problems, such as global climate
change, than for existing, highly regulated problems, such as abandoned hazardous waste sites.
Sixth, by the late 1980’s, there had already been a perceptible shift of the political center
toward a more favorable view of using markets to solve social problems.  The George H. W. Bush
Administration, which proposed the SO2 allowance trading program and then championed it through
an initially resistant Democratic Congress, was (at least in its first two years) “moderate
Republican;” and phrases such as “fiscally responsible environmental protection” and “harnessing
market forces to protect the environment” do have the sound of quintessential moderate Republican
issues.
15  But, beyond this, support for market-oriented solutions to various social problems had been
increasing across the political spectrum for the previous fifteen years, as was evidenced by
deliberations on deregulation of the airline, telecommunications, trucking, railroad, and banking
industries. Indeed, by the mid-1990s, the concept (or at least the phrase), “market-based
environmental policy,” had evolved from being politically problematic to politically attractive.
Seventh and finally, the adoption of the SO2 allowance trading program for acid rain control
— like any major innovation in public policy — can partly be attributed to a healthy dose of chance
that placed specific persons in key positions, in this case at the White House, EPA, the Congress,16Within the White House, among the most active and influential enthusiasts of market-based environmental instruments
were:  Counsel Boyden Gray and his Deputy John Schmitz, Domestic Policy Adviser Roger Porter, Council of
Economic Advisers (CEA) Member Richard Schmalensee, CEA Senior Staff Economist Robert Hahn, and Office of
Management and Budget Associate Director Robert Grady.  At EPA, Administrator William Reilly — a “card-carrying
environmentalist” — enjoyed valuable credibility with environmental advocacy groups; and Deputy Administrator
Henry Habicht and Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation William Rosenberg were key, early supporters of
market-based instruments.  In the Congress, Senators Timothy Wirth and John Heinz provided high-profile, bi-partisan
support for the SO2 allowance trading system and, more broadly, for a wide variety of market-based instruments for
environmental problems through their “Project 88” (Stavins 1988).  And, finally, in the environmental community, EDF
Executive Director Fred Krupp, Senior Economist Daniel Dudek, and Staff Attorney Joseph Goffman worked closely
with the White House to develop the initial allowance trading proposal.
17There continues to be more rhetoric than understanding about what is really entailed in an economic perspective of
environmental problems.  For a response to the “straw men” frequently set up and attacked by those hostile towards an
economic viewpoint, see:  Fullerton and Stavins (1998).
18Although such ethical objections to the use of market-based environmental strategies have greatly diminished, they
have by no means disappeared (Sandel 1997).
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and environmental organizations.
16  The result was what may remain the golden era in the United
States for market-based environmental strategies.
3.  OUTLOOK
Despite the arguments made for decades by economists and many others, there seems to be
little political support in the United States for broader use of benefit-cost analysis to assess proposed
or existing environmental regulations.  These analytical methods remain on the periphery of policy
formulation.  As long as leaders on both sides of the debates in the policy community continue to
react on ideological bases to proposals for such “regulatory reform,” the status quo is unlikely to
change.
17  Perhaps the significant changes that have taken place over the past twenty years with
regard to market-based environmental policy instruments can provide a model for progress.
Certainly the change has been dramatic.  Market-based instruments have moved center stage,
and policy debates today look very different from those twenty years ago, when these ideas were
routinely characterized as “licenses to pollute” or dismissed as completely impractical.
18  Market-
based instruments are considered seriously for each and every environmental problem that is tackled,
ranging from endangered species preservation to regional smog to global climate change (Stavins
1997).  It is reasonable to anticipate that market-based instruments will enjoy increasing acceptance
in the years ahead.
Of course, no particular form of government intervention, no individual policy instrument
— whether market-based or conventional — is appropriate for all environmental problems.  Which
instrument is best in any given situation depends upon a variety of characteristics of the
environmental problem, and the social, political, and economic context in which it is being
regulated.  There is no policy panacea.  But economic instruments are now part of the available
policy portfolio, and ultimately that is good news both for environmental protection and economic
well-being.aSource is Morrall (2003).  Only final rules are included.  Estimates are from respective agencies.  Non-mortality and
non-health benefits were subtracted from the annual cost (numerator) to generate net cost.  For each entry, the
denominator is the estimated number of statistical lives saved by the regulation annually.  Agency abbreviations are as
follows.  CPSC: Consumer Product Safety Commission; EPA: Environmental Protection Agency; NHTSA: National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration; FAA: Federal Aviation Administration; FRA: Federal Railroad Administration;
OSHA: Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
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TABLE 1:  COSTS OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH,
AND SAFETY REGULATIONS THAT REDUCE MORTALITY RISKS
Regulation
Year
Issued Agency
Cost per
Statistical Life
Saved (Millions
of 2002
Dollars)
a
Logging operations 1994  OSHA 0.1 
Unvented space haters 1980  CPSC 0.2 
Trihalomethane drinking water standards 1979  EPA 0.3 
Food Labeling 1993  FDA 0.4 
Passive restraints/belts 1984  NHTSA 0.5 
Alcohol and drug control 1985  FRA 0.9 
Seat cushion flammability 1984  FAA 1.0 
Side-impact standards for autos 1990  NHTSA 1.1 
Low-altitude windshear equipment and training standards 1988  FAA 1.8 
Children's sleepwear flammability ban 1973  CPSC 2.2 
Benzene/fugitive emissions 1984  EPA 3.7 
Ethylene dibromide drinking water standard 1991  EPA 6.0 
NOx SIP Call 1998  EPA 6.0 
Radionuclides/uranium mines 1984  EPA 6.9 
Grain dust 1988  OSHA 11   
Methylene chloride 1997  OSHA 13   
Arsenic emissions standards for glass plants 1986  EPA 19   
Arsenic emissions standards for copper smelters 1986  EPA 27   
Hazardous waste listing for petroleum refining sludge 1990  EPA 29   
Coke ovens 1976  OSHA 51   
Uranium mill tailings (active sites) 1983  EPA 53   
Asbestos/construction 1994  OSHA 71   
Asbestos ban 1989  EPA 78   
Hazardous waste management/wood products 1990  EPA 140   
Sewage sludge disposal 1993  EPA 530   
Land disposal restrictions/phase II 1994  EPA 2,600   
Drinking water/phase II 1992  EPA 19,000   
Formaldehyde occupational exposure limit 1987  OSHA 78,000   
Solid waste disposal facility criteria 1991  EPA 100,000   9
TABLE 2:  MAJOR U.S. TRADEABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS
Program Traded Commodity Period of
Operation
Environmental and Economic Effects
Emissions
Trading Program
Criteria air pollutants under
the Clean Air Act
1974-Present Environmental performance unaffected;
total savings of $5-12 billion
Leaded Gasoline
Phasedown
Rights for lead in gasoline
among refineries
1982-1987 More rapid phaseout of leaded gasoline;
$250 million annual savings
Water Quality
Trading
Point-nonpoint sources of
nitrogen & phosphorous
1984-1986 No trading occurred, because ambient
standards not binding
CFC Trading for
Ozone Protection
Production rights for some
CFCs, based on depletion
potential
1987-Present Environmental targets achieved ahead of
schedule; effect of TP system unclear
Heavy Duty
Engine Trading
Averaging, banking, and
trading of credits for NOx
and particulate emissions
1992- Present Standards achieved; cost savings
unknown
Acid Rain
Reduction
SO2 emission allowances;
mainly among electric
utilities
1995-Present SO2 reductions achieved ahead of
schedule; annual savings of $1 billion
per year
RECLAIM
Program
SO2 and NOx emissions by
large stationary sources
1994-Present Unknown
Northeast Ozone
Transport
Primarily NOx emissions by
large stationary sources
1999-Present Unknown
SOURCE:  Stavins (2003).10
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